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Why general education? Peters, Hirst and history 
 
 
John White 
 
I first met Richard Peters in 1960, as a part-time student enrolled in his 
recently created Joint Honours BA in Philosophy and Psychology at 
Birkbeck College, London. I found his classes in philosophy of mind, the 
history of psychology, and the history of ethics quite inspirational. When he 
left us in 1962 to take up a chair at the Institute of Education, I never 
imagined that three years later I would be joining him as a colleague – or 
that Patricia, whom I had just married, would be doing so too. But so it 
turned out.  
 
We were immediately caught up in his all-consuming project of 
transforming teacher education in England by basing it firmly in the 
educational disciplines, not least philosophy of education. All this tied in 
with government policy for an all-graduate teaching profession, based not 
only on the Post-graduate Certificate of Education, but also on the newly 
introduced four-year Bachelor of Education degree. Philosophy of education 
became a prominent feature of both courses. This meant that lecturers had to 
be trained to teach the subject in both university education departments and 
in the newly established Colleges of Education. In turn, this demanded a 
massive amount of work for Richard Peters and us his colleagues. The new 
Labour government directly supported our work, by funding a one-year, full-
time Diploma in Philosophy of Education at the Institute, specifically 
designed for schoolteachers who wanted to become college lecturers in our 
subject.  
 
It may be hard now to imagine the sense we all had in those optimistic days 
of radical educational reform – it was also the time when secondary schools 
were becoming comprehensives – that we were engaged in a vitally 
important public service. Not that this was in the forefront of our 
consciousness. Rather, it was part of the taken-for-granted background in 
which we worked. That it was so was largely due to Richard Peters‟ own 
deeply-felt belief, shared with his colleague Paul Hirst, that philosophy of 
education should be brought to bear on matters of public importance. They, 
like others of us under their tutelage, saw our subject as a handmaiden of an 
educational service at last becoming reorganised on socially just and rational 
lines.  
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Having been brought up to see all my work – in teaching, scholarship and 
journalism – as intended to serve public ends, I have continued to see it that 
way through my career, despite the knocks that our discipline has taken 
since the 1980s and suggestions from governments and the press that it is at 
best an irrelevance and at worst a drain on the public purse.  
 
Other ways of seeing the subject, on the part of its practitioners, have grown 
up in the last decades. For some, it is harnessed to religious purposes or 
other deeply-held commitments; for others, it is a branch of philosophical 
study in its own right, often centred around exegesis and critique of 
particular thinkers; for others again – and there are overlaps here – its value 
lies in opportunities to interact with like-minded scholars of the subject 
across the world. 
 
Those of us who still see philosophy of education in the older way, as a vital 
contributor to the creation of a decent educational system, do well to cling to 
our perception of it as a public service. If it is to be supported from public 
funds, it is hard indeed to see what other rationale there could be for it than 
this.  
 
For me, this is perhaps the greatest legacy of Richard Peters. Many of his 
specific philosophical arguments have been heavily criticised over the years. 
The essay that follows this introduction also pulls no punches. But what has 
endured, and should continue to endure, is the framework within which 
Richard Peters set philosophy of education, the taken-for-granted framework 
of its being an indispensable public service in a liberal democracy 
committed to justice and freedom. The theme of the essay that follows, the 
proper content of a school curriculum, is one illustration of the public focus 
that has marked all Richard Peters‟ work. 
 
 
      1.  
 
Science, mathematics, history, art, cooking and carpentry feature on 
the curriculum, not bingo, bridge and billiards. Presumably there must 
be some reason for this apart from their utilitarian or vocational value. 
(Peters 1966: 144).  
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Peters (1966, 1973) set out to discover this reason. During his enquiry, 
practical subjects like cooking dropped out of the picture, leaving 
„theoretical enquiries‟ concerned with the pursuit of truth, like science, 
history and literary studies. Peters also collaborated with Paul Hirst, whose 
„forms of knowledge‟ theory was published earlier, in 1965. This, too, 
sought to justify theoretical disciplines on intrinsic grounds. Hirst and Peters 
(1970) took these forms of knowledge as the basis for the curriculum.  
 
With the passing of time, Peters‟ project, then so influential, seems hard to 
make sense of. Why start with academic disciplines and seek justifications 
of them? Logically, curriculum planning has to start with aims, not with 
vehicles whereby aims may be realised.  
 
Looking back, too, there seems to be more to be said than philosophers 
thought at the time for Michael Young‟s (1971: 23) comment in an early 
work of his that the prevailing view of the curriculum favoured by 
philosophers of education (including, incidentally, myself) 
 
appears to be based on an absolutist conception of a set of distinct 
forms of knowledge which correspond closely to the traditional areas 
of the academic curriculum and thus justify, rather than examine, what 
are no more than the socio-historical products of a particular time. 
 
Although Young exaggerates the correspondence he mentions, it is hard not 
to read the above quotation from Peters as taking the traditional school 
curriculum as read and assuming there must be good reasons for it. 
 
 
      2. 
 
 
There is another feature of the Peters project that is hard to fathom. 
Utilitarian reasons for teaching science, mathematics or history are not hard 
to find. But the reason he favours is intrinsic. Why? 
 
This may not seem to raise difficulties. Aren‟t teachers justly delighted when 
a pupil develops a passion for doing science, not out of any instrumental 
motive, but because it is intrinsically fascinating? 
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I‟m sure this is right, but it‟s beside the point. For on Peters‟ view, pupils are 
expected to develop an intrinsic interest not only in an area to which they are 
passionately committed, but across the board, that is, in every mode of 
understanding.  
 
This demand for comprehensiveness is fully explicit in the recommendation 
in Hirst and Peters 1970: 66 that pupils be 
 
significantly introduced to each of the fundamentally different types 
of objective experience and knowledge that are open to men…It is 
therefore not surprising that there is a persistent call that general 
education shall be maintained for all throughout the secondary school 
stage. 
 
The same demand is also apparent in Peters 1966: 
 
..in so far as [a man] can stand back from his life and ask the question 
„Why this rather than that?‟ he must already have a serious concern 
for truth built into his consciousness. For how can a serious practical 
question be asked unless a man also wants to acquaint himself as well 
as he can of [sic] the situation out of which the question arises and of 
the facts of various kinds which provide the framework for possible 
answers? The various theoretical enquiries are explorations of these 
different facets of his experience. To ask the question „Why do this 
rather than that?‟ seriously is therefore, however embryonically, to be 
committed to those inquiries which are defined by their serious 
concern with those aspects of reality which give context to the 
question which he is asking. In brief the justification of such activities 
is not purely instrumental because they are involved in asking the 
question „Why do this rather than that?‟ as well as in answering it.  
(p.164) 
 
Peters thus favours initiation into a comprehensive range of theoretical 
enquiries pursued for intrinsic reasons. This means all students taking an 
intrinsic interest not only in, say, science, but also in a wide range of other 
disciplines. Psychologically, this is asking a lot of them. No doubt there are 
occasional pupils who adore everything they learn. But why expect everyone 
to develop an intrinsic interest in every mode of understanding? 
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In the light of this, it is not surprising that Peters‟ various attempts at 
justifying his „intrinsic‟ position are problematic. The most celebrated 
justification is that quoted above, based on what is presupposed to asking a 
certain sort of question  This is formally similar to Hirst‟s (1965: 256) 
justification of the pursuit of the seven forms of knowledge. Both arguments 
claim to show that in asking such a question one is already committed to the 
intrinsic pursuit of a broad range of kinds of knowledge. It is true that in 
asking „Why do this rather than that? or (in Hirst‟s case) „Why pursue 
knowledge?‟, one wants to know the true, well-founded answer to one‟s 
question. If you like to put it this way, the questioner is committed to the 
pursuit of knowledge on this very specific point. But this does not mean he 
or she is committed to the pursuit of science, philosophy, literature etc, as 
Peters‟ (or Hirst‟s) position requires. (White 1973: pp.10ff, 78ff).  
 
Peters‟ (1973) further wrestlings with the same problem likewise fail to 
clinch things. In Ray Elliott‟s words, Peters here claims that  
 
the educational pursuit of truth in disciplines such as science, 
philosophy, literature and history is in certain fundamental respects 
the same as the pursuit of truth in everyday life or any other non-
educational context, since in any context the pursuit of truth involves 
virtues such as truthfulness, clarity, non-arbitrariness, impartiality, a 
sense of relevance, consistency, respect for evidence, etc. 
 
(Elliott 1977: 231) 
 
The educational study of the disciplines and their objects is justified 
on the ground that through it the learner acquires the rational virtues 
which are essential for reflective thought on matters of a different 
kind, chiefly what the individual is to do or has done, what he believes 
and feels about the various matters with which he is existentially 
concerned, what style of life he is to adopt, and whether the style of 
life he has adopted is a good one. 
 
(p.232) 
 
As Elliott points out, this is a very different kind of justification from that 
found earlier in Peters. It makes a practically wise life the main function of 
education, bypassing the earlier emphasis on pursuing science, philosophy 
etc for their own intrinsic features.  
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Turning back for a moment to Hirst‟s approach to justification, he writes that 
„the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the development of mind in its 
most basic sense‟ (Hirst 1965: 256). Given this equation, this gives Hirst a 
way of justifying the pursuit of the seven forms of knowledge that avoids the 
problem mentioned earlier. Drawing on Greek philosophy, he sees a link 
between the development of mind and the good life, the latter to be 
understood in terms of the former (257).  
 
The argument is only sketched in. But it is problematic. Our mental life is 
various: it includes, for instance, emotional experience as well as states 
connected with knowledge. Hirst says that acquiring knowledge is the 
development of mind „in its most basic sense‟, but in what way is it more 
„basic‟ than, say, using one‟s imagination? Again, why is the good life to be 
understood in terms of mental development (= the pursuit of knowledge), 
seeing that others have located it in artistic activity, living for others, a 
mixed life of all sorts of goods, and so on? I come back to the development 
of mind in Section 7. 
 
Both Peters‟ and Hirst‟s justifications for the intrinsic pursuit of intellectual 
enquiry on a broad front are thus radically problematic.   
 
 
      3. 
 
Ray Elliott also says that although Hirst and Peters (1970) „emphasise that 
the forms [of knowledge] are historical institutions, which have undergone a 
long period of evolution‟, it is surprising that Peters elsewhere gives such an 
a priori account of them.  
 
The aims and procedures of historical institutions…will tend to be 
extremely complex, and to be discoverable only by resolute and 
sensitive empirical enquiry…..[Peters] does not anywhere 
acknowledge that the disciplines stand in need of thoroughgoing 
interdisciplinary investigation and critique. His attitude seems to be 
that they are self-correcting and should be trusted absolutely. (Elliott 
1977: 97-8). 
 
In this connexion, look again at the earlier quotation from Peters: 
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Science, mathematics, history, art, cooking and carpentry feature on 
the curriculum, not bingo, bridge and billiards. Presumably there must 
be some reason for this apart from their utilitarian or vocational value.  
 
The kind of „reason‟ that Peters has in mind concerns justification. But if we 
want to know why science, mathematics etc feature on the curriculum, it is 
more natural to take this as a request for explanation.  
 
I turn now to a historical explanation of the traditional school curriculum. 
This not only draws attention to its contingent character; it also suggests 
answers, historically located and not timeless answers, to the questions: why 
is comprehensive knowledge – getting inside all the forms of knowledge – 
educationally important? And why is it important to be intrinsically 
motivated to have this comprehensive knowledge? 
 
In saying that „Science, mathematics, history, art, cooking and carpentry 
feature on the curriculum‟, Peters was talking about a particular kind of 
curriculum. In a British context, this was, broadly speaking, the curriculum 
for so-called „middle-class schools‟ proposed by the Taunton Commission of 
the 1860s and made compulsory for the new state secondary grammar 
schools introduced in 1904. 
 
The nineteenth-century rival of this „modern‟ curriculum had been the 
classics-based curriculum. This was seen as appropriate for the top public 
schools by the 1861-4 Clarendon Commission. The third great commission 
of that class-conscious decade, the Newcastle, proposed a curriculum based 
on the 3 Rs for the working classes. 
 
By the 1960s, when Peters was writing, the victory of the „modern‟ 
curriculum over its rivals was well under way. It was sealed by the National 
Curriculum in 1988, which imposed it not only on every state secondary 
school but also on every state primary. The ten compulsory subjects of 1988 
were almost identical to those in the 1904 Secondary Regulations. 
 
How did this „modern‟ curriculum grow up in the first place? Why, by the 
1860s, had it been officially identified with middle-class schooling? Two 
preliminary points.  
 
[1] Its core had always been knowledge in its different forms. Physical 
education and more purely aesthetic pursuits had been added in the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries, English literature having been part of the 
knowledge-based core since the eighteenth century, mined for truths about 
human nature and society.  
 
[2] The curriculum had always been based on a notion of general education. 
Although all kinds of institutions, from 1600 onwards, have taught 
individual subjects, from Italian to fencing, the modern curriculum that came 
down to us via Taunton was a compulsory course in a range of types of 
knowledge.  
 
This curriculum can be traced back before the 1860s. You find it in the 
newly-founded University of London in 1826; and after 1838, in the London 
Matriculation exam required for entrance to the London course, but soon 
used by secondary schools for other purposes. You find it in the English 
Dissenting Academies, set up after 1662 to provide a higher education or 
ministerial training for dissenters excluded from Oxford and Cambridge; as 
well as in dissenting secondary schools. You find it from 1570 onwards in 
the Scottish universities [1]. 
 
It is no accident that most of these institutions had connexions with English 
Dissenters and Scottish Presbyterians. These, often with backgrounds in 
industry and commerce, formed a large part of the „middling classes‟ who 
rose to political power in the nineteenth century and for whom Taunton‟s 
„middle-class schools‟ were intended. They were the intellectual descendants 
of radical protestant reformers, mainly Calvinists, of the sixteenth century.  
 
How is it that these largely Calvinist groups came to be associated with the 
„modern‟ curriculum? 
 
 
       4. 
 
 
Pierre de la Ramée  (Ramus) (1515-1573), a poor boy from northern France, 
became Regius Professor of Eloquence and Philosophy at the University of 
Paris in 1551. His central concern was pedagogical. Educated Europeans of 
his day had been brought up in a tradition of Aristotelian scholarship based 
on Greek texts and commentaries on them. It was hard for scholars to make 
headway through the obscurities, and even harder for those unable to afford 
many years of higher education. Ramus provided them with a swift, 
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manageable, way of mastering what they needed to know in a whole range 
of subjects and classical authors. (See Hotson 2007 for material relevant to 
this Section). 
 
The key was his idea of the one, single „method‟. This was based on three 
principles. Items of subject matter had to be all true (unlike dubious material 
in existing textbooks); they were to be grouped together in their proper 
categories (so that, for instance, material on geometry would no longer be 
included in a work on arithmetic); the order of presentation was to be from 
general to particular (and so more assimilable). (Graves 1912: ch 5) 
 
A logical breakdown of the subject-matter was represented visually as a tree 
diagram of the main categories, typically with dichotomised branchings 
taking one towards particularities. Lecture courses led students 
systematically through the material, with planned private study based on 
practical exercises, and feedback to the tutor. 
 
Ramus applied his method to the basic teaching of a wider range of subjects 
than was usual at the time – including arithmetic, geometry, optics, physics 
and music as well as grammar, dialectic and rhetoric. He created a seven-
year curriculum to teach these subjects to boys at a Paris school (Grafton and 
Jardine 1986: 164).  
 
His pedagogical revolution was continued after his death by three Calvinist 
scholars at Herborn Academy in north-west Germany. These were 
Keckermann, Alsted, and Comenius, each of the last two the pupil of the 
preceding one. Together, they pared away inadequate material in Ramus‟ 
system, expanding its range to cover more and more disciplines and sub-
disciplines, including developments in empirical science from Bacon, Kepler 
and others. The process reached its culmination in Alsted‟s comprehensive 
account in his 1630 Encyclopaedia of all branches of theoretical and 
practical knowledge, as well as of the mechanical arts.  
 
Comenius carried on the encyclopaedic project under his own label 
„pansophism‟, developing ways of transmitting a vast amount of knowledge 
in simplified form, eg via his illustrated Orbis Pictus (Comenius 1658) for 
younger  children. His theoretical treatise The Great Didactic (Comenius 
1907) shows the continuity of the Ramist tradition since its founder. It 
advocates first giving children a general outline of a subject; comprehensive 
coverage of the curriculum; adherence to a single method; elimination of 
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unnecessary content; efficient organisation so no time is wasted; practical 
application to everyday life.  
 
 
      5. 
 
 
By 1600 the pedagogical revolution that Ramus initiated became closely 
associated with Calvinism. Although there was by no means a complete 
overlap, the emphasis in Calvinism on an ordered system of beliefs, paring 
away excrescences, simplicity and directness, efficiency and time-saving, 
reduced reliance on authority, diligence in study, and useful application of 
knowledge makes its take-up unsurprising. There was a close association 
between the two movements in Britain, elsewhere in Northern Europe, and 
in New England, where Ramist ideas long remained dominant in Harvard 
College (founded 1636).  
 
Given the close connexion, how far do religious reasons help to explain 
attachment to the Ramist tradition? Pre-1600, in the north German context, 
Hotson (2007) puts most weight on secular motivation. He emphasises the 
attractiveness of a useful, efficient and relatively inexpensive education to 
both a mercantile élite and to local princes building up a civil service 
 
But religious reasons became increasingly important after 1600, as religious 
divisions sharpened across Europe, not least in Britain where Puritans were 
gaining strength. The secular hypothesis may well show the appeal of useful 
knowledge, but does not account for the interest in encyclopaedic 
knowledge. 
 
Traditionally, the pursuit of knowledge had been problematic for the 
Christian, given its role in the Fall. Bacon‟s Instauratio Magna charted a 
solution which strongly appealed to his puritan disciples. He believed that 
„all knowledge is to be limited by religion, and to be referred to use and 
action.‟ As Webster (1975: 22) says,  
 
This conclusion was perfectly adapted to the puritan position; 
investigations conducted into secondary causes, and with utilitarian 
ends in mind, would incur no risk of transgression, but instead glorify 
God...   
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There is a related view about the Fall that weighed with reformers. Man had 
been created in the image of God. The Fall meant that there had to be a new 
„instauration‟ in man of this image. Not all had been lost. The human mind 
still contained „slender rays of its pristine light‟, as manifested in its 
intellectual and volitional abilities (Hotson 2005:1). The school was the 
institution in which these abilities could be developed, and therewith the 
image of God in man restored. The Calvinists Keckermann, Alsted and 
Comenius all thought this way. It was closely connected with their 
encyclopaedism. In Alsted‟s words  
 
Although God alone is wise and all-knowing, nevertheless he 
impresses the image of his perfection on men who desire to learn, as is 
seen especially in those who by vehement force of mind embrace the 
whole orb of the disciplines,‟ that is to say, ‟what is commonly called 
the encyclopaedia.‟ (Hotson 2005:11).  
 
Comenius‟ pansophism and the education he devised to realise it have the 
same rationale. He writes  
 
it is evident that man is naturally capable of a knowledge of all things, 
since, in the first place, he is the image of God. For an image, if it be 
accurate, necessarily reproduces the outlines of its archetype, as 
otherwise it will not be an image. Now omniscience is chief among 
the properties of God, and it follows that the image of this must be 
reflected in man. (Comenius 1907: 41) 
 
Unlike the secular rationale, this religious argument provides a powerful 
reason, within its own terms, for an encyclopaedic education. It is man‟s 
duty on earth to become as omniscient as possible. 
 
 
      6. 
 
 
It could be that curricula originally devised for religious reasons by 
educationalists like Comenius appealed to many students and employers for 
secular reasons, to do with getting on in the world. But the two motivations 
are not, in any case, discrete. Calvinism was devoted to diligent social and 
economic improvement as a sign of devotion to God. The two kinds of 
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reason for a modern, general education interweave through its later history 
in Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.  
 
We find both of them in the extraordinary story of the „Three Foreigners‟ 
who ran educational policy for the Puritans between 1640 and 1660. These 
were Samuel Hartlib, John Dury, and Comenius himself – all educated by 
pupils or admirers of Keckermann (Hotson 1994: 45). Comenius, invited to 
England by Parliament in 1641-2, projected a millenarian reform of English 
education for the approaching „last age of the world....in which Christ and 
his Church shall triumph… an age of Enlightenment, in which the earth shall 
be filled with the knowledge of God, as the waters cover the sea‟ (Trevor-
Roper 1967: 271). To this end, he recommended a national system of 
education from a central „Pansophical‟ college down to elementary schools.  
 
After 1660, Anglicanism triumphed. Puritans and other radical protestants – 
e.g. Quakers – who refused to conform were excluded from public life. But 
the schools and academies that these „Dissenters‟ now set up, often illegally, 
kept alive the modern curriculum. As earlier, religious reasons went along 
with secular ones.  
 
Three examples of the former. Philip Doddridge (1728: 48), writing of 
students like himself following a modern curriculum at Kibworth Academy 
around 1720, states that „they are taught in all the several Branches of their 
Course to acknowledge God and direct their Enquiries and their Labours to 
his Glory‟.  
 
In 1786, Thomas Barnes, principal of the new Manchester Academy, wrote 
 
Of all subjects, DIVINITY seems most to demand the aid of kindred, 
and even of apparently remoter sciences. Its objects are GOD and 
MAN: and nothing, which can either illustrate the perfections of the 
one, or the nature, capacities, and history of the other, can be entirely 
eliminated….Natural Philosophy, in its widest sense, comprehending 
whatever relates to the history or properties of the works of Nature, in 
the Earth, the Air, the Ocean, and including Natural History, 
Chemistry, &c. has an immediate reference to the one – and to the 
other belong, all that Anatomy and Physiology can discover relating 
to the body, and all that Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, History, or 
Revelation declare concerning the mind. (Sell 2004: 11-12) 
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Grove House School, in Tottenham, was a Quaker foundation of 1828. It 
included natural philosophy (physics) in its broad curriculum, partly for 
reasons of mental training, but also because it helped pupils to acquire  
 
a clearer and enlarged vision of the wisdom of the Supreme Being in 
the wonderful regularity of the Laws of Nature. 
 
(Brown 1952: 8) 
 
 
      7. 
 
 
I come back to Peters and Hirst and the problem of justifying a general, 
modern curriculum on intrinsic grounds. We saw earlier that their own 
arguments are problematic. The historical sketch shows us that, in the earlier 
history of this modern curriculum, there was a good reason, given a certain 
religious framework, why it [a] should cover the whole range of knowledge, 
and [b] be intrinsically important. [2]  
 
Could there be any echoes of the old religious justification in the writings of 
the 1960s? In case this seems totally implausible, let‟s look for a moment at 
Philip Phenix‟s theory.  
 
Phenix 
 
Philip Phenix (1964) discusses the ideal curriculum somewhat as Hirst does 
– in terms of a small number of logically distinct categories of 
understanding. 
 
Phenix was educated at Union Theological Seminary in New York. In 
Phenix 1961 he wrote that „the central task of education is religious 
conversion‟ (p242), and that „We are reserving the name of religion in the 
present analysis for a reverential attitude to what is of ultimate value‟ 
(p237). „This is the one supreme purpose which unites all the lesser purposes 
of education: to engender reverence‟ (p252).  
 
In Phenix 1964 he spelt out his abstract schema for the curriculum, based on 
six „realms of meaning‟: symbolics, empirics, esthetics, synnoetics, ethics 
and synoptics. The book‟s first words are  
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It is not easy to sustain a sense of the whole. Many a person pursues 
his own limited calling with scarcely a thought for his place in the 
total drama of civilised endeavour (p3). 
 
And a little later he writes 
 
Students and teachers alike are prone to take the curriculum as they 
find it, as a traditional sequence of separate elements, without ever 
inquiring into the comprehensive pattern within which the parts are 
located (ibid). 
 
This last quotation assumes that the traditional curriculum does have a 
comprehensive pattern behind it, but has come to be taken as a collection of 
disparate items. Phenix is a latter-day encyclopaedist, recalling his readers to 
a wholeness that once lay behind the curriculum‟s now disconnected parts. 
At the same time, he does not see this wholeness as an undivided totality: 
like Hirst, and like the Ramist thinkers, he sees it as subdivisible on logical 
principles into a number of discrete realms. 
 
Peters 
 
Phenix‟s emphasis on reverence reminds us of Peters‟ comment in his 
transcendental argument that, unlike games, academic disciplines are not 
„hived off from man‟s curiosity about the world and his awe and concern 
about his own peculiar predicament within it‟. He fills this out by a 
quotation from Whitehead about the value of religion to a human life in 
merging „its individual claim with that of the objective universe‟ (Peters 
1966: 164). As Ray Elliott (1986: 57) writes, Peters‟   
 
response to Being-in-totality and to human being-in-the-world, on the 
contemplation of them, is one of piety... he attaches what is, according 
to his own account, a religious significance to that which gives and 
discovers meaning and which receives and discloses it. 
 
When he wrote the passage mentioned above, Peters had been a Quaker for 
some thirty years. His teaching experience after the war had been in the 
Quaker school at Sidcot in Somerset, founded in 1699. In 2008 the school‟s 
on-line prospectus tells us that „Education should be a joyful experience of 
self-development and an inspiring introduction to the wonders of creation‟. 
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This reflects, as perhaps does Peters‟ comment, Quakerism‟s attachment 
since its inception to the revelatory power of the natural world and to the 
role of science in exploring it.  
 
I do not know how much weight, if any, to put on the suggestion that Peters‟ 
argument may have some continuity with older religious justifications.  
 
Hirst 
 
One way of coping with some of the problems in Hirst‟s position would be 
to fill out his account with arguments taken from the Ramist tradition. But 
this would be to saddle it with a theological rationale which he would reject. 
 
Three features of Hirst are reminiscent of this tradition. 
 
First, both favour an education in every branch of knowledge. As with 
Keckermann, Alsted and Comenius, Hirst makes it clear that this ideal can 
only be realised at the level of general principles, not detailed content (Hirst 
1965: 261).  
 
Secondly, the totality of knowledge subdivides by logical principles into 
smaller categories. Hirst‟s seven forms of knowledge parallel the academic 
disciplines identified by Ramus and his successors. In each case, the logical 
discreteness of these units is stressed.  
 
Thirdly, Hirst makes links between [1] the pursuit of knowledge in every 
domain, [2] the development of mind (in one place he refers to „the 
comprehensive development of the mind in acquiring knowledge‟ (Hirst 
1965: 261)), and [3] the good life.    
 
[1] The Ramist tradition prizes encyclopaedic knowledge because [2] this 
helps to bring the learner‟s mind closer to the mind of God as an omniscient 
being. It furthers, in Alsted‟s words, the „instauration of the image of God in 
Man‟. [1] and [2] are also connected with [3], the good life. For, assuming 
the theological framework within which Alsted and others were working, the 
only good life could be one‟s existence as an immortal soul after one‟s 
salvation, a life freed from the snares of the body and devoted to spiritual 
activity. 
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As I have said, Hirst would reject such a rationale. Although he was brought 
up in a strict evangelical faith, he early abandoned this and saw his theory of 
liberal education as wholly rationally, not theologically, based (Hirst 2008). 
 
 
      8. 
  
 
How significant are parallels between 1960s thinking and the religious 
tradition in question? I am aware of the temptation to read too much into 
them; and present what I hope is a more rounded historical picture in Section 
8. Meanwhile I would like to explore the point about the development of 
mind in a somewhat different territory . 
 
The development of mind is a key concept for Hirst, as we have seen, and 
also for Peters. Like Hirst, he links it with learning to operate within the 
„differentiated modes of thought and awareness‟ of a scientific, 
mathematical, historical, religious, moral or aesthetic sort (Peters 1966: 50).  
 
A predecessor to scientific psychology was pneumatics (or pneumatology). 
This had to do with the nature of spirits, and was divided into work on the 
„powers and faculties‟ of the human mind, and work on the being of God. It 
was a staple subject in dissenting academies, Scottish universities, and – 
often in a different form – in American universities and colleges. In the 
nineteenth century, it became secularised as scientific psychology. (White 
2006: 100-6) 
 
It was also in the nineteenth century that intrinsic justifications of the 
academic curriculum begin to appear, based on psychological claims about 
human faculties. In New England, the 1828 Yale Report justifies its general 
course in terms of the mental powers that each subject specifically develops.  
 
In laying the foundation of a thorough education, it is necessary that 
all the important mental faculties be brought into exercise….. The 
mind never attains its full perfection, unless its various powers are so 
trained as to give them the fair proportions which nature designed.   
 
[http://collegiateway.org/reading/yale-report-1828/ pp.6-7] 
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The Report appeared in the period before the emergence of scientific 
psychology and traces of New England Puritanism are evident in the passage 
quoted. It echoes the seventeenth century notion of the instauration of the 
image of God in man, already referred to. For Alsted, acquiring 
encyclopaedic knowledge helps to remedy the defects of our intellectual 
faculties and thus to restore in us the ruined image of God. (Hotson 2005: 
10-11). We find the same idea in John Dury‟s The Reformed School 
(1650:38), where he is describing the true end of learning: 
 
to marshal sciences [ie forms of knowledge] rightly that they may be 
taught orderly and profitably, the subordination of their various ends 
to each other…and the way of teaching the same …must be 
observed… For the encyclopaedia of the sciences must answer the 
wheel of human faculties, and this wheel must answer the circle of 
creatures [phenomena created by God] whence man is to supply his 
defects. 
 
Faculty psychology became influential in the nineteenth century largely 
owing to the philosopher Thomas Reid‟s elaboration of it in his Essays on 
the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785). These powers embraced sense-
perception, memory, conception, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, and taste. 
Reid, who had been a Presbyterian minister before becoming an academic, 
saw his work as a contribution to pneumatology. He wrote that  
 
The mind of man is the noblest work of God which reason discovers 
to us, and therefore, on account of its dignity, deserves our study.  
(Preface: xxxv) 
 
Faculty psychology was used to justify the academic curriculum.not only in 
USA but also in Britain. Here justifications in terms of faculties became 
increasingly applied to modern subjects after 1860. In 1867, J M Wilson, 
science master at Rugby, writes in Farrar (ed). that  
 
the mental training to be got from the study of science is the main 
reason for its introduction into schools…The student of natural 
science is likely to bring with him to the study of philosophy or 
politics, or business, or his profession, whatever it may be, a more 
active and original mind, a sounder judgment and a clearer head in 
consequence of his study. 
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(quoted in Adamson 1930: 313-4). 
 
The following year, 1868, the Taunton Report favoured „the general 
cultivation of the intellect‟ or „powers of the mind‟: 
 
In their view the great merit of natural science is that it is “an 
important agent in mental discipline”, the value of geometry lies in its 
“exercise of severe reasoning”; drawing  “strengthens habits of 
accurate observation”…. Latin was to be retained “partly because all 
teachers agree in praising its excellence as a mental discipline”  
[Adamson 1930: 260] 
 
In 1879, the psychologist Alexander Bain published his influential 
Education as a Science. He held that „the primary, if not the whole, aim of 
instruction was mental discipline‟ (Adamson 476). The „highest 
justification‟ for Mathematics, for instance, has to do with its role in training 
the „whole mechanism of reasoning‟ (Bain 1879: 152). „The Practical or 
Applied Sciences‟, on the other hand – Bain mentions among others 
navigation, engineering, agriculture, medicine, politics, ethics, law, grammar 
and rhetoric – „have no purpose beyond their immediate application. None 
of them can be accounted sciences of Method, Discipline, or Training.‟ (pp. 
163-7). 
 
In his preface to the 1904 Secondary Regulations introducing the academic 
curriculum into state education, Robert Morant underlined the importance of 
general education. This 
 
must be such as gives a reasonable degree of exercise and 
development to the whole of the faculties, and does not confine this 
development to a particular channel…. Specialisation… should only 
begin after the general education has been carried to a point at which 
the habit of exercising all these faculties has been formed. 
 
Leaving aside problems about how faculties are identified – for Morant is 
not specific – why did he think it important that all the faculties be 
developed? He does not say. 
 
Paul Hirst‟s theory was in part a reaction to the justification found in the 
Harvard Report of 1946 on General Education in a Free Society. This was 
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in the same psychological tradition. The Report argued that a general 
education based on the natural sciences, the humanities and social studies 
develops certain mental abilities: „to think effectively, to communicate 
thought, to make relevant judgments, to discriminate among values‟. 
Although the filling is different, the form of the argument is similar to 
Morant‟s. 
 
Hirst defined his own position against Harvard‟s, arguing that the abilities it 
mentions have a place only within specific forms of thought. What counts as 
„effective thinking‟, for instance, is very different in history and 
mathematics. Even so, Hirst‟s position is close to Harvard‟s (and Morant‟s) 
in the place it accords the development of mind in the rationale for a general 
education.  
 
Whatever the historical links may be between Hirst‟s and earlier forms of 
psychological justification, there is no doubt about the originality of Hirst‟s 
„forms of knowledge‟ argument among accounts of the academic curriculum 
between, say, 1800 and when he wrote in the 1960s. From the Yale Report 
of 1828, via Taunton, Morant, the Norwood Report, and through to the 
Harvard Report of 1946, these accounts have been largely brief and 
unsystematic. Hirst‟s argument is quite different. It presents us with a tightly 
organised system of categories – the „forms‟ – derived a priori from the 
nature of knowledge itself. There has been nothing like this in the history of 
education since Comenius and his forebears in the Ramist pedagogical 
tradition. 
 
One last speculation. The latest manifestation of Harvard‟s ancient 
attachment to general education are Howard Gardner‟s eight or nine 
„multiple intelligences‟. Like Hirst‟s „forms‟, they do not map exactly on to 
conventional school subjects, but are, even so, close to them.  
 
Gardner‟s writings on the content of education favour the „general 
education‟ tradition. He writes 
 
Education in our time should provide the basis for enhanced 
understanding of our several worlds – the physical world, the 
biological world, the world of human beings, the world of human 
artifacts, and the world of the self. (1999:158) 
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He also thinks this understanding should be largely for intrinsic ends. ‟I 
favor …the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake over the obeisance to 
utility‟ (p.39).   
 
Does the link that Gardner makes between pursuing this or that branch of 
knowledge and the development of these or those types of intelligence 
indicate a revival of the faculty psychology mode of justification? 
 
There are question-marks about the ultimate basis of Gardner‟s theory, just 
as there are about Hirst‟s and about Peters‟. All three favour the acquisition 
of comprehensive general knowledge for intrinsic reasons; and all equate 
this with the development of mind. But their justifications give out at this 
point.  
 
         9. 
  
 
The Ramist pedagogical tradition had a theological justification for 
developing the mind/forms of knowledge for intrinsic rather than practical 
reasons. This keystone, that once held the whole argument together, has long 
since crumbled away. This did not happen all at once. The original idea that 
acquiring the whole circle of knowledge remedied the defects of human 
faculties lived on in the shape of curriculum justifications reliant on faculty 
psychology, at first within a religious framework, and later in the nineteenth 
century within a scientific one. These justifications, although shot to pieces 
by Dewey and by John Adams among others, lived on into the mid twentieth 
century, supported by Morant in 1904 and the Harvard Report in 1946. Paul 
Hirst‟s retention of the development of mind as a justification for an 
academic curriculum, while rejecting the faculty psychology interpretation 
of this, was, until the appearance of Howard Gardner‟s work, the last, now 
highly abstract, manifestation of this ancient tradition. 
 
As faculty psychology arguments for the academic curriculum grew less 
influential after 1900, other arguments for its intrinsic value began to take 
their place. The Norwood Report of 1943, which helped to create the post-
war tripartite system, is an important text here. It incorporated another kind 
of psychological argument – based not on faculty psychology but on the 
psychology of individual differences championed most notably by Cyril 
Burt. An academic curriculum, it held, suited a certain kind of secondary 
pupil only – one with a high level of general intelligence. It claimed that 
  21 
children of this sort were driven by a love of intellectual learning for its own 
sake. The grammar school, in its eyes, was appropriate for  
 
the pupil who is interested in learning for its own sake, who can grasp 
an argument or follow a piece of connected reasoning, who is 
interested in causes, whether on the level of human volition or in the 
material world, who cares to know how things came to be as well as 
how they are, who is sensitive to language as expression of thought, to 
a proof as a precise demonstration, to a series of experiments 
justifying a principle: he is interested in the relatedness of related 
things, in development, in structure, in a coherent body of knowledge 
(Norwood Ch.1).….For a mind showing promise of this kind the 
grammar school has traditionally provided a curriculum which it 
regards as appropriate (Ch.2) 
 
Two decades after Norwood, it was left to the new school of British 
philosophy of education under Hirst and Peters to theorise and justify on 
philosophical grounds an academic curriculum within the framework 
inherited from Norwood, but without linking this curriculum only with the 
most intellectually able and without relying on individual psychology to do 
so. In Peters‟ case, but not in Hirst‟s, there is also a faint echo of an older, 
religious, justification.  
 
Neither of the two psychology-based justifications, nor the philosophical 
ones of Peters and Hirst, succeeded in showing why an academic curriculum 
was worth studying for intrinsic, ie. non-practical, reasons. After Hirst and 
Peters intrinsic justifications of any sort, psychological, philosophical or 
whatever, were rarely attempted.  
 
There is a plausible explanation of this. Already by the end of the eighteenth 
century, many English dissenting families, not least those who made use of 
the liberal academies and Scottish universities, had become wealthy through 
business and manufacturing. They were often exercised by social status 
reasons, intent on a liberal education for their sons suitable for a gentleman 
(Mercer 2001: 50). They saw science as a key component of this. It was „the 
mode of cultural self-expression by a new social class who had hitherto felt 
socially and politically ostracized‟ (p.42).  
 
This last point is worth dwelling on. Although some economic historians 
have seen dissenting academies as utilitarian institutions, preparing their lay 
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students for commercial and industrial careers, there is little evidence for 
this (p.40). What was important was a general education based on modern 
subjects. The religious rationale that had long lain behind this was joined 
from the 1780s onwards by the status reason just mentioned (p.42). 
 
This non-utilitarian reason for favouring an academic education persisted 
through the nineteenth century. It was given a boost by the Taunton Report‟s 
association of a modern rather than a classical curriculum with the middle 
classes and also by Morant‟s introduction of fee-paying state secondary 
schools for a tiny percentage of the population in 1904. As the twentieth 
century progressed, the position of the academic curriculum was reinforced 
by the introduction of the School Certificate in 1917 which required a pass 
in a range of academic subjects; and also by the growth of subject 
associations and subject departments in secondary schools (Goodson 1987: 
29-30) 
 
One reason why non-utilitarian justifications of the academic curriculum  
faded away after the 1960s is that, owing to the entrenchment of its position 
in schools, it was increasingly taken as read that an academic education of 
this sort was a good thing.  Socialists from R H Tawney (1922) onwards  
assumed that „secondary education for all‟ meant „academic secondary 
education for all‟. (This is indeed what I myself believed in the 1960s and 
early 1970s). Richard Peters, as we saw at the beginning of this essay, took it 
for granted that there must be some good intrinsic reason for an academic 
curriculum. 
 
Perhaps the most notorious example of this taking-for-granted is that when 
Kenneth Baker laid down his ten-subject National Curriculum in 1988, he 
felt no obligation to provide any reasons why this kind of structure was a 
good thing. Justification was now otiose. 
 
After 1988, as teachers and others began more and more to ask what the 
National Curriculum was for, the government produced sets of aims, in 1999 
and in 2007, within which the existing subjects were supposed to find a 
rationale. The era of taking-for-granted seemed to be over. The only problem 
– a major one, and one with which we are still living – is that, through all the 
reforms since 1988, governments have insisted that the existing structure of 
academic subjects is not to be tampered with. Rather than seizing the 
opportunity to rethink school education as a genuinely aims-based 
  23 
enterprise, they have clung to the centuries-old pattern described in this 
paper.  [3]  
 
 
 
 
 
Notes  
 
[1] Here are some early examples of modern curricula. References in White 
(n.d.). 
 
Melville’s Glasgow University after 1574  Year 1: humanities (Greek and 
Latin) and Ramus‟ dialectic. 2: mathematics, cosmography, astronomy. 3: 
moral and political science. 4: natural philosophy (physics) and history. 
 
Keckermann’s Danzig gymnasium 1602. Year 1: logic and physics. 2: 
metaphysics and mathematics (including astronomy and geography as well 
as arithmetic and geometry). 3: practical philosophy (ethics, philosophy and 
economics. 
 
King’s College, Aberdeen 1641. Year 1: mainly Greek and Hebrew.2: logic, 
rhetoric and mathematics. 3: ethics, politics and economics. 4: natural 
philosophy (including astronomy, geography, optics, music). 
 
Doddridge’s Northampton Dissenting Academy 1720s. Year 1: logic, 
rhetoric, geography, metaphysics, geometry, algebra. 2: trigonometry, conic 
sections, celestial mechanics, natural and experimental philosophy, divinity, 
orations. 3: natural and civil history, anatomy, Jewish antiquities, divinity, 
orations. 4: civil law, mythology and hieroglyphics, English history, history 
of nonconformity, divinity, preaching and pastoral care 
 
Wesley’s Kingswood School 1749. Reading, writing, arithmetic, English, 
French, Latin, Greek, Hebrew; history, geography, chronology; rhetoric, 
logic, ethics, geometry, algebra, physics, music.  
 
Scottish Universities MA in Arts course, eighteenth century. Year 1: Greek 
tended to be taught. 2: logic and metaphysics. 3: ethics and pneumatics. 4: 
natural philosophy, probably including some mathematics 
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University of London 1826. Years 1,2: Latin, Greek and mathematics. 3: 
logic and philosophy of mind, chemistry and natural philosophy. 4: 
jurisprudence, political economy, natural philosophy, moral and political 
philosophy  
 
Grove House (Quaker) School, Tottenham 1828. Latin and Greek, principles 
of religious liberty and the British constitution, geography and history in 
relation to the Bible, advanced and applied mathematics, natural philosophy. 
 
London Matriculation exam after 1838. A range of academic subjects close 
to those taught for the early London BA course – including mathematics, 
natural philosophy, chemistry, Greek and Latin, English language, outlines 
of history and geography, and (for Honours) natural history  
 
[2] J.H.Newman (1854) was a well-known advocate of the intrinsic value of 
university education. Although he did not favour a general course, he did 
say, of the university as a whole, that  
 
all branches of knowledge are connected together, because the 
subject-matter of knowledge is intimately united in itself, as being the 
acts and the work of the Creator…..….. Knowledge is capable of 
being its own end. Such is the constitution of the human mind, that 
any kind of knowledge, if it be really such, is its own reward.  
(Discourse 5, Section 1). 
 
[3] This paper takes much further a theme first explored in White 2005. 
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